Key points
- Minnesota (2020), Massachusetts (1997) and South Carolina (2000) abolished champerty by court decision.
- Kentucky's statute, KRS 372.060, voids contracts to aid a suit for a share of the recovery, and the Sixth Circuit applied it to consumer funding in 2019.
- New York's statute exempts claim purchases with an aggregate price of at least $500,000.
- North Carolina went further than champerty doctrine in 2026 and made litigation investment unlawful by statute.
What the two words mean
The Minnesota Supreme Court, quoting Black's Law Dictionary, defines champerty as an agreement to divide litigation proceeds between the owner of the claim and an unrelated party who supports or helps enforce it. Maintenance is improper assistance in a lawsuit given by someone with no bona fide interest in the case. Maslowski v. Prospect Funding Partners
The Ohio Supreme Court puts the relationship simply: champerty is a form of maintenance in which a nonparty furthers another's suit in exchange for part of the recovery. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding A funding agreement fits that description on its face. The doctrine usually surfaces as a contract defense: someone argues the funding agreement is void.
State positions we could source
This table is partial. It covers 15 states for which we read the statute or the court opinion itself. A state's absence means we did not source it. Several entries rest on older or lower-court decisions, noted in the row.
| State | Position on champerty | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| Arizona | Not recognized | Landi v. Arkules (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) |
| California | Never adopted | Estate of Cohen (Cal. Ct. App. 1944) |
| Colorado | No longer exists | Fastenau v. Engel (Colo. 1952) |
| Delaware | Recognized, but a funding deal that leaves the claim with the plaintiff is not champerty | Charge Injection v. DuPont (Del. Super. 2016) |
| Florida | Recognized; requires officious intermeddling | Kraft v. Mason (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) |
| Illinois | Maintenance is a statutory offense | 720 ILCS 5/32-12 |
| Kentucky | Champertous contracts void by statute; applied to consumer funding | KRS 372.060; Boling (6th Cir. 2019) |
| Maine | Champerty is a Class E crime; consumer legal funding regulated separately | 17-A M.R.S. § 516 |
| Massachusetts | Abolished | Saladini v. Righellis (Mass. 1997) |
| Minnesota | Abolished | Maslowski v. Prospect Funding (Minn. 2020) |
| New York | Codified and narrowed; safe harbor for purchases of $500,000 or more | Judiciary Law § 489; Justinian Capital (N.Y. 2016) |
| Ohio | Policy against champerty preserved; funding allowed only as statute permits | Rancman (Ohio 2003); 2026 H.B. 105 |
| Pennsylvania | A viable defense; investor share of a fee held champertous | WFIC v. LaBarre (Pa. Super. 2016) |
| South Carolina | Abolished as a defense | Osprey v. Cabana (S.C. 2000) |
| Texas | Funding agreements held not to violate public policy | Anglo-Dutch v. Haskell (Tex. App. 2006) |
States that abolished the doctrine
Three state high courts ended the doctrine outright. Massachusetts ruled in 1997 that champerty, barratry and maintenance would no longer be recognized. South Carolina abolished champerty as a defense in 2000, while adding that its decision did not address or authorize selling shares in a lawsuit to investors.
Minnesota followed on June 3, 2020 in a case about a consumer funding contract. The court reasoned that rules of professional responsibility and civil procedure now deal with the abuses the old rule targeted. Courts in California, Colorado and Arizona have said the doctrines were never adopted or no longer exist there.
States where champerty can still void a contract
Kentucky is the clearest example. Its statute voids any contract to aid a suit in return for part of the thing sued for. In Boling v. Prospect Funding Holdings the Sixth Circuit affirmed a ruling that consumer litigation funding agreements violated that statute and Kentucky's usury law and were void.
Pennsylvania courts treat champerty as a live defense. In 2016 the Superior Court held invalid an agreement that gave litigation investors a share of a lawyer's contingent fee. Illinois and Maine keep criminal statutes: Illinois punishes officiously assisting another's suit with money with a view to promote litigation, and Maine classes champerty as a Class E crime.
Ohio shows the doctrine and a funding statute living together. The Ohio Supreme Court held in 2003 that a contingent advance to a litigant was champerty and void unless legislation allowed it. The legislature then authorized consumer advances, and its 2026 replacement law, House Bill 105, states an intent to preserve the policy against champerty outside what the statute permits. Ohio H.B. 105, as enrolled
States that kept the doctrine and narrowed it
New York codified champerty in Judiciary Law § 489, which bars buying a claim with the intent and for the purpose of suing on it. The same section exempts purchases with an aggregate price of at least $500,000. The Court of Appeals enforced both halves in 2016, finding a purchase champertous where the buyer had not actually paid the price needed for the safe harbor.
Delaware's Superior Court said in 2016 that it would keep recognizing champerty and maintenance, then held that a Burford financing agreement was neither, because the plaintiff still owned its claims and nothing had been assigned. Florida requires officious intermeddling, so a lender the litigant sought out was not a champertor. A Texas appeals court held that funding agreements did not violate public policy.
Is litigation funding champerty?
Litigation funding meets the dictionary definition of champerty, but whether that makes a funding contract unenforceable depends on the state. Minnesota abolished its champerty rule in Maslowski v. Prospect Funding Partners in 2020, Delaware upheld a commercial funding agreement in 2016, and the Sixth Circuit held consumer funding agreements void under Kentucky's champerty statute in 2019.
Three contract features recur in these decisions: whether the claim owner keeps control of the case, whether the claim itself was assigned, and whether the funder sought out the litigant. Which state's law governs a given agreement is a question for counsel.
A statutory ban, and the English position
North Carolina did not rely on champerty. Session Law 2026-14, approved June 22, 2026, makes it unlawful to engage in litigation investment in the state and voids contracts that violate it. It applies to proceedings commenced, and contracts made, renewed or amended, on or after that date. N.C. Session Law 2026-14 The details are in disclosure rules by court and state.
England and Wales abolished the crimes and torts of maintenance and champerty in 1967 but kept the rule that such a contract may be unenforceable. Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 14 In PACCAR in 2023 the UK Supreme Court held that funding agreements paying the funder a share of damages were damages-based agreements and unenforceable unless they met the rules for those agreements. [PACCAR, [2023] UKSC 28](https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/uksc/2023/28) The government said in December 2025 that it would legislate to reverse that result prospectively. Written statement HLWS1189 No such amendment appeared on legislation.gov.uk when we checked on November 18, 2026.
Sources
- Maslowski v. Prospect Funding Partners LLC, 944 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 2020) (Minnesota State Law Library)
Minnesota’s common law prohibition against champerty is abolished.
- Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 2003-Ohio-2721 (Supreme Court of Ohio)
Such an agreement constitutes champerty and maintenance and thus is void
- Substitute House Bill 105, 136th Ohio General Assembly, as enrolled (R.C. 1357.011)
The general assembly intends to preserve and reinforce the general public policy expressed in that holding against champerty and maintenance.
- Saladini v. Righellis, 426 Mass. 231 (1997)
We rule that the common law doctrines of champerty, barratry, and maintenance no longer shall be recognized in Massachusetts.
- Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Limited Partnership, 340 S.C. 367 (2000) (South Carolina Judicial Branch)
We abolish champerty as a defense because we believe it no longer is required to prevent the evils traditionally associated with the doctrine
- Estate of Cohen, 66 Cal. App. 2d 450 (1944) (Harvard Law School Library, Caselaw Access Project)
California is one of the many states that has never adopted the common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance
- Fastenau v. Engel, 125 Colo. 119 (1952) (Caselaw Access Project)
Common-law maintenance and champerty no longer exist in Colorado
- Landi v. Arkules, 172 Ariz. 126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (Caselaw Access Project)
we agree with the defendants that champerty is not recognized in Arizona
- Kentucky Revised Statutes § 372.060 (Kentucky Legislative Research Commission)
whereby the thing sued for or in controversy or any part thereof, is to be taken, paid or received for such services or assistance, is void
- Boling v. Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC, No. 18-5599 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2019) (GovInfo)
Kentucky has statutory prohibitions on champerty and usury.
- WFIC, LLC v. LaBarre, 148 A.3d 812 (Pa. Super. 2016) (Caselaw Access Project)
Moreover, we conclude that the 2008 Fee Agreement is champertous and, therefore, invalid.
- 720 ILCS 5/32-12, Maintenance (Illinois General Assembly)
with a view to promote litigation, he or she is guilty of maintenance and upon conviction shall be fined and punished as in cases of common barratry
- Maine Revised Statutes, Title 17-A, § 516, Champerty (Maine Legislature)
Champerty is a Class E crime.
- New York Judiciary Law § 489 (New York State Senate)
having an aggregate purchase price of at least five hundred thousand dollars
- Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB AG, 28 N.Y.3d 160 (2016) (New York Courts)
we hold that Justinian's acquisition of the notes was champertous and, further, that Justinian is not entitled to the protection of the safe harbor provision
- Charge Injection Technologies, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2016) (Delaware Courts)
The Court does not find the arrangement constitutes maintenance.
- Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (Caselaw Access Project)
officious intermeddling is a necessary element of champerty
- Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2006) (Caselaw Access Project)
Accordingly, we hold that the agreements do not violate Texas public policy.
- North Carolina Session Law 2026-14 (House Bill 315), Prohibit Litigation Investments Act
Section 1 of this act applies to civil proceedings commenced on or after that date and applies to contracts entered into, renewed, or amended on or after that date
- Criminal Law Act 1967, section 14 (legislation.gov.uk)
shall not affect any rule of that law as to the cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal
- R (PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28 (The National Archives)
they are unenforceable and unlawful since they did not comply with the formal requirements for such agreements
- UK Parliament, Written Statement HLWS1189, Third-Party Litigation Funding (17 December 2025)
we will legislate to clarify that LFAs are not Damages Based Agreements, with prospective effect